This paper investigates the effect of continuous terror attacks and anti-terrorism policy on stock and bond markets and on the risk premium required by investors. The empirical findings are based on a unique sample of 280 terror events experienced in Israel and 58 targeted killings carried out as anti-terrorism policy during the Intifada years, 2000-2003. Based on daily and intra-daily data of share prices and an index of terror intensity, our main findings are: i) share prices declined by about 0.48% on average following each terror attack but the decline in share prices was due to continued deterioration in expected future cash flows and not due to increased risk premium;; ii) anti-terrorism policy had an insignificant effect on share prices; iii) short-term government bonds substituted for investment in stocks in response to terror attacks 4
Introduction
The discounted-cash-flow valuation model states that stock prices reflect investors' expectations about future corporate earnings and cost of capital. Accordingly, if terror attacks negatively affect expectations of firms' profitability and/or positively affect the cost of capital due to increased uncertainty, share prices are expected to decline.
Following the 9/11 attack in NY and the two terror attacks in European capitalsMadrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005) -local financial markets seemed to rapidly recover, indicating that the attacks' effect was transitory. Unlike these events, in this paper we test the hypothesis that the effects of continuous terror attacks on the stock and bond markets are not transitory and yet they do not affect the risk premium required by investors. We also raise the hypothesis anti-terrorism attacks had no effect on the capital markets.
The research is based on a unique sample of 280 terror events witnessed in Israel during the [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] Intifada. The sample allows us to estimate the effect of terror attacks in an economy constantly afflicted by such attacks (an average of one attack 5 every two days). 1 It extends Eldor, Hauser and Melnick (2007) paper by investigating different aspects of the economic damage suffered by investors in financial markets including the effect of anti-terrorism policy, terror intensity, investors expectations vs.
the risk-premium required by them and the substitutability of the bond and stock markets. The effect of anti-terrorism policy on the stock and bond markets is investigated by analyzing market behavior after 58 cases of targeted killings. 2 The level of investor pessimism is assessed by a Terror Index (TI) comprised of factors characterizing the attack, especially its location (inside or outside the Green borderline whether it was a suicide attack, the number of casualties (killed and wounded) and the scope of newspaper coverage.
3
This is the also first study that analyzes the effect of terror attacks on stock and bond markets as well as on the substitutability of the two markets. The study extends the findings of recent research that has attempted to estimate the economic damage inflicted by terror attacks. In some of these studies, the economic damage was estimated on the basis of the number of attacks and the number of casualties, economic growth rates and share prices.
4
One of the studies dealing with the permanence of the effect of terror attacks on economic costs was that conducted by Eldor, Hauser and Melnick (2007) who analyzed the intra-day effects of routine terror attacks and found a permanent effect.
Another study conducted by Chen and Sims (2004) , who analyzed 14 cases of terror-1 See for example Eldor, Hauser and Melnick (2007) , Chen and Sims (2004) , Brooke and Vickstrom (2004) and Johnston and Nedlesceau (2005 Our hypothesis regarding the permanent (or transitory) character of these effects also relates to the Brooke and Vickstrom (2004) argument that the economic effects of terror are felt in the period following the attack and that the extent of the losses depends on the attack's characteristics -the number of people killed and wounded and the level of property damage. They claim that the impact of visually tangible results (as in the case of the 9/11 attack) should be compared with the effect of fear of other types of attacks, which cultivates anxiety and thus exhibits long-term indirect negative outcomes. These arguments are also explored in this study from several directions, including estimation of the effect of the attack's characteristics (suicide bombings, number of killed and wounded, location, etc.) on the respective financial markets.
One factor frequently ignored in the literature is the dilemma facing governments regarding the relationship between anti-terror policy and that policy's economic impacts. Garfinkel (2004) (2002) for a description of the Tel Aviv system). Data on the characteristics of the terror attacks and on the time of the attacks were culled from the databank maintained by the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzeliya and from newspaper reports.
Place Table 1 about here To measure the effect of the risk premium, we also used the S&P500 daily price index and a global index. The global index was constructed as a weighted average of four 9 currencies (those used for almost 100% of Israel's foreign trade): the US dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen and Canadian Dollar. The daily weights were extracted from the basket of currencies calculated and published by the Central Bank of Israel. The daily return was calculated in Israeli currency by using the exchange rate of a unit of each of the basket's currencies per 1 NIS.
Methodology
We use an event-study analysis based on daily data (closing prices) and intra-day data (half-minute prices) of the TA-25 index (the 25 largest companies traded on the TASE). Using the daily data, we estimated the rates of return of the TA-25 stock index on the day prior to the event (-1), the day of the event (0), the day following the event (+1) and two days after the event (+2). If the rates of return on the second day after the attack were either not significant or exhibited a sign different from the overshooting response, we consider it evidence of the terror attack's permanent influence on stock prices.
Following the Eldor, Hauser and Melnick (2007) We then ran the following regression: Finally, we examined the effect of the government's response to the terror attacks by means of targeted killings. It is aimed at testing the hypothesis that anti-terror policy (targeted killings) has a positive effect on stock prices by compensating for the negative influence of terror attacks on capital markets as well as the general economy. 11 3.
The Stock Market
Declining share prices may be due to a decline in the anticipated profitability of firms and/or a rise in the cost of capital, possibly due to increased risk premiums. In this section we test the effect of terrorism on investors' expectations and on the risk premium required by them.
Similar to Eldor, Hauser and Melnick (2007) we find an immediate decline of share prices by an average of CAR(-1,2)=0.48% (p-value=0.006) in share prices. Next day changes in share prices were insignificantly different from zero.
Based on basic present value reasoning, there are two possible explnations to this decline: Either terrorism increases the cost of equity through an increase in the market's systematic risk and/or the market price of risk; or it decreases traders' expectations regarding firms' profitability and the economy as a whole. The latter possibility is difficult to verify empirically since it needs a complete model of the economy that will provide testable assumptions as to agents' formation of expectations. Instead, given the fact that share prices decline following terror attacks, we test whether this decline is also due to increased risk premiums by examining whether the Israeli market's aggregate systematic risk and risk premiums have been affected by terrorism.
5 Over 100 Israeli firms are listed in the US; 38 of these firms are traded in the US, the majority on the NASDAQ as well as the Tel Aviv Stock exchanges. Some also enjoy a very high volume of trade in Israel, which is affected by both markets.
For this purpose, we first examined systematic risk over time by estimating a simple unconditional international capital asset pricing model using the S&P500 as the market portfolio. This choice is dictated by the historical linkage between the Israeli and the US markets, stemming from the fact that most of Israeli foreign trade is with the US and that a large number of Israeli companies are traded on US exchanges. We thus ran the following regression:  is not significantly different from 0. The most important finding here, which is at the heart of our analysis, is that the Israeli market's Beta, relative to the US market, has not been affected by the Intifada. We consequently tend to conclude that the Israeli market's systematic risk remained unchanged throughout the Intifada.
To check for the robustness of our findings, we ran regression (3) on monthly returns.
The results are: The findings, using monthly data confirm, the results obtained with daily data and are even better.
Another robustness test was conducted by using an alternative market portfolio. We built a market portfolio based on the basket of currencies used by the Israel's Central Bank to conduct its monetary policy. This basket of currencies (similar in its nature to SDRs) contain currencies from the main regions of the world with which Israel carries on important exchange relationships; the weight of each currency is related to the weight of the country and/or the region in Israel's foreign trade. To build the 14 alternative market portfolio return, we used the indices for each of these regions, as described in Section 2.3. The results using daily returns were: The overall picture emerging is a robust response to the question of whether the continuous terror attacks during the period studied provoked a decline in asset prices through expected cash flows or through the discount rate. It appears that during the Intifada, the market price of risk did not change and that the decline in share prices resulted from agents' expectations of future deteriorating cash flows from stock holdings. That is, "routine" terror attacks caused investors to become more pessimistic and little by little reduced their expectations of a firm's future profits. This occurred without raising their evaluations regarding the height of the risk premium -so long as the wave of terror continued.
4.

The effect of terror attacks on bond prices
Bond prices are primarily influenced by two factors, operating in polar directions.
The first factor is investors' expectations of a rise in interest rates as a result of 15 increases in uncertainty, an event that has a negative impact on bond prices. Second, if investors decide to transfer their investments in stocks to more solid investments, such a decision will have a positive effect on bond prices due to the increased demand. In order to determine which of these factors is more dominant, we estimated changes of different bond indices, including the general bond index (0-15 years), the short-term bond index (redemption within 2 years) and long-term bonds (redemption within 10 to 15 years). (2004) and Zussman and Zussman, (2006) ).
This hypothesis is been tested in two ways. First, we used an event-study analysis to examine the effect of the 58 targeted killings on stock prices. We found that on the days that targeted killings were executed, stock prices rose insignificantly, by an average of about 0.13% (CR(-1,1), p = 0.680).
Second, we compared changes in stock and bond prices on the days when targeted killings took place immediately after the terror attack with other days, when no targeted killings occurred subsequent to terror attacks. The findings are shown on Table 3 . Table 3 about here It appears that stock prices declined on days when targeted killings followed terror attacks by about 0.32% in comparison to 0.45% on the days when no targeted killings were executed. The difference (0.13%) between them is similar to the positive effect on stock prices obtained in the first test, a result that also lacks statistical significance (p = 0.301). In contrast, however, when compared to days on which targeting killings did not follow a terror attck, we found significant increases in the prices of the general and government short-term bond indices on those days that targeted killings did take place. The general bond index rose by about 0.071% in response to terror attacks when no targeted killings were executed and declined by about 0.005% on the days when targeted killings were executed shortly after an attack.
Does this finding contradict economic intuition? Not necessarily, especially when one takes into account the finding that investors substitute their investments in stocks for investments in bonds, particularly short-term government bonds. The latter is consistent with the described tendency of investors to exchange stocks for the government bonds in response to terror attacks, but only on days when no targeted killings took place. Alternatively, on those days when targeted killings were not executed, this tendency remained dormant. These findings support the Jin and
Mockland (2004) model in the sense that within the stock market, investor responses to demonstrations of government anti-terror policy are much less extreme than on days when such actions did not take place.
Testing the permanent effect of terrorism on capital markets
In section 3 we analyzed the effect of terror attacks on stock prices. We found that stock prices declined at an average of about 0.4% but no evidence of overshooting and subsequent corrections. In section 4 we found a significant increase of bond prices. In this section, we provide an additional test of the permanent effects of terror attacks on the stock and bond markets by applying a regression model (2) suggested by Eldor and Melnick (2004) . However, unlike Eldor and Melnick, we enter the pessimism (terrorism) index ( Table 4 indicate that the effect of terror attacks on the stock and government bond markets are permanent (general index of government bonds).
The two regressions indicate that it impossible to accept the hypothesis that 
Summary and conclusions
In this article we investigated the influence of "routine" terror attacks on capital markets over time. The study was based on a unique sample containing data on 280
terror events carried out in Israel during 2000-2003 in addition to 58 instances of targeted killings, the latter representing the Israeli government's anti-terrorism policy.
The sample allowed us to examine whether the influence of continuous terror attacks can be permanent.
The main findings are: (1) Unlike cases of sporadic terror attacks, such as those in NY (9/01), Madrid (3/04), London (7/05) or even Israel (7/06), share prices declined by an average 0.48% in response to each terror attack, with accumulated damage to firm values of about 30% during the three years of the Intifada. This decline was not, however, due to any increase in the risk premium. (2) Share prices were not affected by Israel's anti-terrorism policy (targeted killings) in response to terror attacks; we found that stock prices increased by 0.13% after each targeted killing, executed in the wake of a terror attack, but that the increase was not statistically significant. (3) "Routine" terror attacks caused investors to transfer investments from stocks to more solid channels, such as short-term government bonds; (4) the effect of "routine" terror attacks on capital markets is permanent and "routine" in the sense that we observed neither overreaction to attacks nor corrections on days subsequent to the events.
Our findings appear to imply that the threat of global terror may have significant permanent negative effects on a country's growth and the behavior of their capital markets. 
